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n 1994, welfare rolls began to fall precipitously. In her study, 
Rebecca Blank reviews the research that tries to separate the 
effect of the economy on this decline from the effect of policy 
changes. The paper by Robert Moffitt and David Stevens 
attempts to determine whether the Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF) program has changed the labor market 
characteristics of welfare recipients. An important motivation 
for both papers is to help predict what will happen when the 
economy takes a downturn. If changes in caseloads are mostly 
due to the booming economy, caseloads will probably increase 
rapidly in a recession. If, instead, the decline in the rolls is due 
to program changes, caseloads might increase more slowly in a 
recession. 
Both Blank and Moffitt and Stevens rely on the standard 
economic model of caseloads. In this model, caseloads depend 
on program parameters that affect eligibility and the economic 
attractiveness of participation. The macroeconomy affects 
caseloads by changing the attractiveness of work, which is an 
alternative to program participation. But not everyone who is 
eligible for welfare takes it. Only about two-thirds of families 
eligible for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 
actually participated in the program. Furthermore, the 
standard economic model is unable to explain fully early 
increases in AFDC caseloads or the current decline. This fact, 
combined with relatively low take-up rates for welfare, suggests 
that something other than the standard economic variables 
may be important for explaining changes in welfare rolls. In a 
well-known paper, Moffitt (1983) invoked welfare stigma to 
help explain low take-up rates. Stigma is only one aspect of the 
norms and values that affect caseload changes. 
The standard economic model treats norms and values as 
constants, not as variables. Over the long run, changes in social 
norms and values affect caseloads by affecting demographic 
characteristics such as marriage and fertility, which affect 
eligibility. In the shorter run, changes in norms and values 
affect the success of program changes. In turn, program 
parameters are often meant to change norms and values. 
Program parameters have a smaller effect when they are 
contrary to strongly held norms and values. Since 1967, AFDC 
recipients have been required to seek work. But in 1967, there 
was a lot of social ambiguity about whether mothers of young 
children should work. In 1970, less than a third of married 
mothers of pre-school-age children worked at all and many of 
these women worked part-time. In the absence of a strong 
work norm among mothers of young children, there were few 
social supports, including child care, for working mothers. In 
addition, work rules for AFDC were vague, reflecting the 
ambivalence of legislators and the public about mothers of 
young children working. Together, these factors made it easy 
for caseworkers to make “excuses” for clients who did not show 
up for job interviews or otherwise seek employment, and few 
welfare recipients were sanctioned for such behavior. As more 
and more middle-class mothers of young children went to 
work, social approval for working mothers increased (as did 
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availability of child care). This shift clearly encouraged 
legislators to pass increasingly aggressive work rules for welfare 
recipients and encouraged caseworkers to feel more confident 
in sanctioning mothers who did not cooperate with these rules.
Norms and values can also affect many aspects of program 
implementation. For example, high levels of social hostility 
toward welfare recipients by society as a whole could lead 
caseworkers to treat potential recipients in ways that 
discourage their participation in welfare programs.  This social 
hostility stigmatizes welfare recipients, reducing participation 
among those who are eligible. This means that if the take-up 
rate among eligibles does not change, changes in norms and 
values regarding welfare cannot be a big factor in caseload 
changes.1 Blank (2001) finds that almost all of the change in 
caseloads between 1984 and 1995 was attributable to changes in 
eligibility, and little was due to changes in take-up rates. 
However, take-up rates among those eligible for the food stamp 
program and Medicaid seem to have fallen since TANF was 
implemented, so take-up rates for welfare benefits may also 
have declined.
Both program rules and the economy can affect norms and 
values. Conservatives believed not only that AFDC provided 
disincentives for single mothers to work, marry, and control 
their fertility, but also that it fostered a “culture of poverty.” By 
this, they meant that a set of social responses to incentives 
provided by AFDC had been internalized into norms and 
values that perpetuated poverty even when incentives changed. 
The low value placed on work and marriage reduced the extent 
to which they responded to changes in the economy and in 
welfare rules. Not working, it was argued, was due to attitudes 
toward work, not to the unavailability of jobs. TANF was 
supposed to change behavior as well as these norms and values.  
Changes in norms and values that result from a change in 
program parameters in turn affect future responses to 
economic change and changes in program parameters. Imagine 
a state in which strong work rules are implemented during a 
strong economy. More single mothers become employed, so 
fewer are eligible for welfare. The welfare caseload declines. 
With the increase in job opportunities, the stigma associated 
with welfare receipt increases. Caseworkers become less 
sympathetic to mothers who do not work and treat welfare 
applicants more harshly. This causes some eligible mothers to 
reject welfare. Caseloads decline further. Because fewer 
mothers receive welfare, the availability of information on how 
to receive it decreases. When unemployment increases, higher 
stigma and less information persist for some period, delaying 
an increase in caseloads. According to this scenario, norms and 
values can also affect the composition of the caseload. As 
welfare becomes more disfavored, advantaged women get jobs 
while the least advantaged remain eligible but are less likely to 
participate. Thus, welfare rules can affect take-up rates 
differently for women with different skill levels.
There is no easy way to measure norms and values directly, 
so it is not surprising to find that empirical evidence on how 
norms and values influence welfare caseloads and vice versa is 
at best suggestive. Blank (2001) and Wallace and Blank (1999) 
find that Democratic governors and state representatives are 
associated with higher caseloads in a state.  Political parties with 
more liberal attitudes toward welfare may create a political 
climate in which families feel like they can ask for help and in 
which state civil servants see their job as helping recipients 
rather than discouraging them from taking welfare.2Moffitt 
(1983) argues that changes in stigma explained changes in take-
up rates in the late 1960s.
 Social networks that include welfare recipients increase the 
likelihood that a person will receive welfare.  Gottschalk (1992) 
finds that among women eligible for welfare, those who grew up 
in families that received welfare were more likely to receive it 
themselves than those who grew up in families that were 
eligible for but did not receive welfare.  Bertrand et al. (1999) 
find that among non-English speakers, exposure to others who 
speak your language increases welfare use more for individuals 
from language groups with high welfare use than for 
individuals from language groups with low welfare use.  These 
studies imply that welfare use results from either shared norms 
and values or shared information.  These effects may not be 
trivial.  Bertrand et al.’s estimates suggest that a policy change 
that would increase welfare caseloads by 1 percent in a group in 
the absence of networks can be expected to actually result in an 
observed increase of between 15 and 25 percent in that group.  
Although norms and values may not be the most important 
determinants of caseload changes, they remain an under-
studied and potentially important source of such changes.Endnotes
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1.  If take-up has declined, it does not prove that norms and values 
have changed, since several factors affect take-up rates.
2.  Of course, more liberal regimes may also implement more liberal 
AFDC policies, but these studies try to control for this possibility.
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